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THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS RULES
AS INTERPRETED IN THE DECISIONS
LESTER B. ORFIELD*
On February 24, 1933, an act of Congress was approved which
authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice and pro-
cedure with respect to proceedings after verdict in criminal cases.' On
March 8, 1934, an amendatory act was approved so as to include in
Section 1 proceedings after "finding of guilt by the court if a jury
has been waived, or plea of guilty."2" The amendatory act also included
proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States, and added a
proviso "that nothing herein contained shall be construed to give the
Supreme Court the power to abridge the right of the accused to apply
for a withdrawal of a plea of guilty, if such application be made within
ten days after entry of such plea, and before sentence is imposed." Sec-
tion 2 of the original act was amended so as to authorize rule making
with respect to applications for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court
has pointed out that the legislative history of the 1934 amendment shows
that it was made because it would not be desirable that there should be
different times and manner of procedure in cases of appeal where there
is a verdict of a jury'as distinguished from that in which there is a find-
ing of guilt by the court on the waiver of a jury.-
*Professor of Law, University of Nebraska; author of CRIMINAL APPEALS
IN AmERrcA (1939) ; and THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTlON (1942) ;
member, United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure. 147 STAT. 904 (Feb. 24, 1933).
S 48 STAT. 399 (March 8, 1934). " . . the Supreme Court of the United
States shall have the power to prescribe, from time to time, rules of practice and
procedure with respect to any or all proceedings after verdict, or finding of guilt
by the court if a jury has been waived, or plea of guilty, in criminal cases in
district courts of the United States, including the District Courts of Alaska,
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, and Virgin Islands, in the Supreme Courts
of the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, in the United States Court
for China, in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, in the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia, and in the Supreme Court of the United States:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to give the Supreme
Court the power to abridge the right of the accused to apply for withdrawal of
a plea of guilty, if such application be made within ten days after entry of such
plea, and before sentence is imposed.
"Sec. 2. The right of appeal shall continue in those cases in which appeals
are now authorized by law, but the rules made as herein authorized may prescribe
the times for and manner of taking appeals and applying for writs of certiorari
and preparing records and bills of exceptions and the conditions on which super-
sedeas or bail may be allowed.
"Sec. 3. The Supreme Court may fix the dates when such rules shall take
effect and the extent to which they shall apply to proceedings then pending, and
after they become effective all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further
force."
3 Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, 61 S. Ct. 810, 85 L. ed. 1172 (1941).
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Several cases have referred to the rules as the "Criminal Appeals
Rules."4 In order to aid the Court a draft of proposed rules was sub-
mitted on May 26, 1933, by the Attorney General of the United States.5
The Supreme Court promulgated the rules by what has been referred
to by Chief Justice Hughes as the "promulgating order."
The rules "have the force and effect of federal statutes" ;7 but it
does not follow that "every act or proceeding taken by the trial court
which may not be in strict conformity with these rules is necessarily
void as done or performed without jurisdiction.' 8 For instance, even
though there were improper delay in imposition of sentence, the sen-
tence would still be valid.
The rules make no mention of motions to vacate judgment or of
appealable orders. "Hence the appealability must be determined by
Federal law." 9  An order denying defendant's motion to set aside a
judgment of conviction and permit defendant to withdraw his plea of
guilty made in the same term in which the challenged judgment was
entered is not appealable.
An allegation that Rule 11(4) is unconstitutional, as depriving the
defendant of the right of trial by jury in allowing him only ten days to
withdraw his plea of guilty, willnot be considered, where it does not
appear that the defendant at any time sought to withdraw his plea.?0
The rules "cannot destroy or restrict the right of appeal but may
prescribe the time for taking the appeal."'-
A defendant may take his appeal in his own person by filing his
' Mookini v. United States, 303 U. S. 201, 58 S. Ct. 543, 82 L. ed. 748 (1938) ;
Forte v. United States, 302 U. S. 220, 58 S. Ct. 180, 82 L. ed. 209 (1937) ; Ray
v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 81 L. ed. 976 (1937); Evans v.
United States, 90 F. (2d) 851, 852 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) ; Long v. United States,
90 F. (2d) 482, 483 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) ("Criminal Appeals Rule"); Young
v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 305 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937) ("appellate criminal
rules") ; United States v. Adamowicz et al., 82 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936)
("appellate criminal rules of the Supreme Court") ; White et al. v. United States,
80 F. (2d) 515, 516 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). The late Federal Circuit Judge Rufus
E. Foster gave an address to the Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit entitled
"Criminal Appeals Rules," published in 1 Fed. Rules Dec. 261-263 (1939).
1 Mookini v. United States, 303 U. S. 201, 58 S. Ct. 543, 82 L. ed. 748 (1938).
The rules are set out in 292 U. S. 660, 78 L. ed. 1512 (1934). They are also set
out as amended with notes to the decisions in 18 U. S. C. A. §688 (Supp. 1942).
' Mookini v. United States, 303 U. S. 201, 58 S. Ct. 543, 82 L. ed. 748 (1938) ;
and see the majority opinion of Douglas, J., in Nye v. United States, 313 U. S.
33, 61 S. Ct. 810, 85 L. ed. 1172 (1941).
"Gallagher v. United States, 82 F. (2d) 721 (. C. A. 8th, 1936). The court
cited as in accord: Fewox v. United States, 77 F. (2d) 699 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
See also Mookini v. United States, 303 U. S. 201, 58 S. Ct. 543, 82 L. ed. 748
(1938) ; Wainer v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 77, 79 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; Wolpa
v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 829, 830 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
' Berkowitz v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 881, 884 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
9 Bensen v. United States, 93 F. (2d) 749, 750 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
" Williams v. Sanford, 110 F. (2d) 526, 527 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
"'Meyers v. United States, 116 F. (2d) 601, 603 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941). See
also Fewox v. United States, 77 F. (2d) 699, 700 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
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notice of appeal, and may also proceed in his own person with the
perfection and presentation of his record on appeal.
12
The purpose of the rules is to force speedy termination of criminal
proceedings and to expedite appeals.13 The rules were not made for the
benefit of the litigant who invokes them, but to serve the general good
by simplifying and expediting trials. Unless the violation of a rule of
procedure by the court is fundamental, the litigant should not be
allowed to complain.
PROMULGATING ORDER
Order, paragraphs 1 and 2. Pursuant to the provisions of the
Act of Congress, approved March 8, 1934, amending an Act en-
titled "An Act to give the Supreme Court of the United States
authority to prescribe Rules of Practice and Procedure with re-
spect to proceedings in criminal cases after verdict" (Act of Feb-
ruary 24, 1933, c. 119, U. S. C., Title 28, Sec. 723(a)).
It is ordered on this seventh day of May, 1934, that the fol-
lowing rules be adopted as the Rules of Practice and Procedure
in all proceedings after plea of guilty, verdict of guilt by a jury
or finding of guilt by the trial court where a jury is wai-ed, in
criminal cases in District Courts of the United States and in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and in all subsequent
proceedings in such cases in the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals, in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia,
and in the Supreme Court of the United States.
The rules do not apply to appeals from the police court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia but only to those from the District Court for the
District of Columbia.14 An Act of Congress of June 7, 1934, changed
the name of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.' 5 An
Act of June 25, 1936, changed the name of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia to District Court of the United States for the
District of Columbia.' 6
A circuit court of appeals held that the rules applied to criminal
cases in the United States District Court for the Territory of Hawaii.
17
"2 Boykin v. Huff, 121 F. (2d) 865, 873-874 (U. S. Ct. of App. D. C. 1941),
noted (1941) 27 IowA L. REv. 133. (1941) 14 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 69, (1942)
27 WAsH. U. L. Q. 272.
" .Ex parte United States, 101 F. (2d) 870, 876 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), note
18, aff'd by a four to four vote without an opinion, United States v. Stone, 308
U. S. 519, 60 S. Ct. 177, 84 L. ed. 441 (1940).
" Clawans v. District of Columbia, 89 F. (2d) 802, 804 (U. S. Ct. of App.
D. C. 193z-), cert. denied, 301 U. S. 692, 57 S. Ct. 794, 81 L. ed. 1348 (1937).
This wt aLeld as to Rule IX, paragraph 4.
314b STAT. 926 (June 7, 1934). 1649 STAT. 1921 (June 25, 1936).
' Mookini v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 126, 127 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
[Vol. 21
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This was because it had the jurisdiction of a district court of the
United States, was by law required to proceed in the same manner as
a district court, and appeals from that court to the circuit court were
required to be taken in the same manner as appeals from the regular
district courts. The Supreme Court reversed and held the rules in-
applicable to the Territory of Hawaii.' 8  The Attorney General, in
submitting a draft of proposed rules on May 26, 1933, to the Court at
the request of the Court, had stated that there were not sufficient data
at hand upon which to predicate proposals as to Hawaii and other Ter-
ritories and possessions. It lay in the power of the Court under the
rule-making statute to limit the application of the rules to the regular
-district courts and the District of Columbia. Tlje term "District Courts
of the United States" as used in the rules without an addition ex-
pressing a wider connotation describes the constitutional courts created
under Article 3 of the Constitution. Territorial courts on the other
hand are legislative courts and not district courts of the United States.
Vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the
district courts of the United States does not make it a "District Court
of the United States." "Not only did the promulgating order use the
term District Courts of the United States in its historic and proper
sense, but the omission of provision for the application of the rules to
the territorial courts and other courts mentioned in the authorizing act
clearly shows the limitation that was intended."
The Criminal Appeals Rules do not as originally drawn apply to
the Canal Zone.19  C
On March 17, 1941, the Supreme Court issued an order effective,
July 1, 1941, extending the operation of the rules to cases arising in
the district courts of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and
the Virgin Islands, though not to the United States Court for China.
20
The order read as follows:
"IT IS ORDERED, that the Rules of Practice and Procedure, after
plea of guilty, verdict or finding of guilt, in criminal cases brought in
the District Courts of the United States and in the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia, promulgated by order of May 7, 1934 (292
U. S. 661), and amended by orders of May 24, 1937 (301 U. S. 717),
May 31, 1938 (304 U. S. 592), and October 21, 1940 (311 U. S. 731),
18 U. S. C. A. following section 688, be and they hereby are made
8 Moolcini v. United States, 303 U. S. 201, 58 S. Ct. 543, 82 L. ed. 748 (1938)
(certiorari). The Act of February 13, 1925, 28 U. S. C. A. §,§225, Z30, allowing
three months was therefore held to apply.
"0 Schackow et a[. v. Government of the Canal Zone, 104 F. (2d) 681, 682
(C. C. A. 5th, 1939). The court cited Mookini v. United States, 303 U. S. 201,
58 S. Ct. 543, 82 L. ed. 748 (1938).
2 See 312 U. S. 721, 61 S. Ct. CLIII, 85 L. ed. 1560 (1941); 18 U. S. C. A.
§688, p. 128 (Supp. 1941), for the order.
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applicable to all proceedings after plea of guilty, verdict or finding of
guilt by the trial court where a jury is waived, in criminal cases in the
District Courts of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone and Virgin
Islands, and in all subsequent proceedings in the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court of the United States.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that these rules shall be applicable to pro-
ceedings in all cases in such courts in which a plea of guilty shall be
entered or a verdict or finding shall be rendered on or after the first
day of July, 1941."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in December 1937 that the
Criminal ._ppeals Rules, particularly Rule III, apply to criminal con-
tempts since, while there is no right to jury trial in all contempt cases,
there may nevertheless be a plea of guilty in a criminal contempt.2 1.
Moreover, since there may be a jury trial in some criminal contempt
cases, a contrary interpretation would result in two different methods
of appeal in criminal contempt cases.
Where, however, in a criminal contempt case there was no plea of
guilty, no verdict of guilt by a jury, and no finding of guilt by the
court after waiver of jury, the Criminal Appeals Rules did not apply.22
The qualifying language of the rules, contrary to the argument by the
government, does not designate merely the stage of the proceedings in
criminal cases when the rules become applicable, but the rules describe
the kind of cases to which they should be applied. The court reasoned
as follows: The Act of March 8, 1934, amended the Act of February
24, 1933, which gave the Supreme Court rule-making power "with
respect to any or all proceedings after verdict in criminal cases." The
legislative history shows that the amendment in 1934 was made because
it would not be -desirable that there should be different times and man-
ner of procedure in cases of appeal where there is a verdict of a jury
as distinguished from cases in which there is a finding of guilt by the
court on the waiver of a jury. The original act covered only cases
tried by a jury. "In light of this history and the language of the order
promulgating the rules we conclude that the categories of cases em-
Wilson v. Byron, 93 F. (2d) 577, 579 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), noted (1938)
16 N. C. L. REv. 389. The court also relied on Section 2 of the act authorizing
criminal appellate rules. 48 STAT. 399, §2 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A. §723(a) (1941).
The statute provides that the right of appeal shall continue in those cases in which
appeals are authorized by law, but that the rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court with reference to the manner of taking appeals shall control. In accord
that an appeal in a criminal contempt case is governed by the Criminal Appeals
Rules see McCrone v. United States, 100 F. (2d) 322, 323 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
2 Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, 61 S. Ct. 810, 85 L. ed. 1172 (1941).
Followed as to an appeal from a judgment by the trial court convicting defend-
ant of criminal contempt committed in the presence of the court. United States
v. Bollenbach, 125 F. (2d) 458, 460 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
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braced in the rules cannot be expanded by interpretation to include
this type of case."
23
The Supreme Court does not deny that as to appeals from civil
contempts, where the action is pending September 16, 1938, or later,
appeal will be under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 24
At any rate an Act of Congress of November 21, 194i, expressly
extended the rule-making power of the Supreme Court to "proceedings
to punish for criminal contempt of court.
'25
Order, paragraph 3. It is further ordered that these rules shall
be applicable to proceedings in all cases in which a plea of. guilty
shall be entered or a verdict or finding of guilt shall be rendered,
on or after the first day of September, 1934.
The rules do not apply to a judgment rendered March 30, 1934,
since the rules had not yet become effective 6  Hence a motion to
remand a case to the district court for hearing a motion for a new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence, first presented to the cir-
cuit court of appeals, would be denied.
RULE i. Sentence
Rule I, paragraph 1. After a plea of guilty, or a verdict of guilt
by a jury or a finding of guilt by the trial court where a jury is
waived, and except as provided in the Act of March 4, 1925, c.
521, 43 STAT. 1259, sentence shall be imposed without delay unless
(1) a motion for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty, or in arrest
of judgment or for a new trial is pending, or the trial court is of
opinion that there is reasonable ground for such a motion; or (2)
the condition or character of the defendant, or other pertinent
matters, should be investigated in the interest of justice before
sentence is imposed.
On May 24, 1937, the Supreme Court by order amended Rule I,
paragraph 1, adding this sentence: "The judgment setting forth the
" Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, 44, 61 S. Ct. 810, 813, 85 L. ed. 1172,
1178 (1941).
" McCrone v. United States, 307 U. S. 61, 59 S. Ct. 685, 83 L. ed. 1108
(1939). However, the case arose before September 16, 1938, and was therefore
held governed by statutory rules of civil appeals. For the case below see Mc-
Crone v. United States, 100 F. (2d) 322 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938). See also Nye v.
United States, 313 U. S. 33, 61 S. Ct. 810, 85 L. ed. 1172 (1941) ; Note, Contempt
of Court, Civil and Criminial, Review of Contempt Orders in the Federal Courts
(1938) 16 N. C. L. REv. 389.
2555 STAT. 779 (1941), 18 U. S. C. A. §689 (Supp. 1942).
26Needham v. United States, 73 F. (2d) 1, at 3 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934). Nor did
the rules apply to a conviction on June 14, 1934. Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.
(2) 868, 880 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) (as to supersedeas).
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sentence shall be signed by the judge who imposes the sentence and
shall be entered by the clerk."
2 7
Even though a sentence is imposed after great and inexcusable
delay, habeas corpus would not lie, nor would a writ of prohibition
lie to restrain the judge from imposing sentence on the ground that he
had lost jurisdiction of the case. 28 * Possibly the United States Dis-
trict Attorney could prosecute mandamus proceedings to require the
judge to impose sentence. Where there is a postponement of sentence
without cause it may be error, but the court still has jurisdiction. Al-
though imposing a sentence to begin in the future is not a practice to
be recommended, if a court had no jurisdiction to do so it could not
impose consecutive sentences. This would be an undesirable restriction
of power. A case may be continued to a subsequent term for sen-
tencing. This was applied to a plea of guilty made on March 17, 1937,
where sentence was imposed on May 26, 1938.
Rule I does not change, nor was it intended to change, the sub-
stantive law relative to jurisdiction.29 There is no penalty attached to
the rule. The rule was adopted for the purpose of expediting criminal
cases after verdict. The rule requiring sentence without delay is not
for the benefit of the defendant, who cannot complain if the government
does not vigorously insist on a rule promulgated for its benefit. Neither
can the surety on the bail complain of a violation of the rule. However,
a suggestion in one case 30 that the rule is not for the benefit of a defend-
ant, but for the benefit of the government, was rejected. It is equally
important that the defendant have the benefit of the rule, and that upon
his request, unless good cause to the contrary appears, the court should
accommodate him by imposing sentence without delay. The Supreme
Court in promulgating the rule had in mind the interest of the prisoner
as well as of society. But the substantive law relative to jurisdiction
remains unchanged. Hence a delay in imposing sentence does not strip
the trial court of jurisdiction.
A study of certain cases decided before and after the adoption of
the rules has shown the following intervals between verdict and sen-
tence: in the First Circuit 5 days before and 13 days after, in the Sec-
2-301 U. S. 717, 57 S. Ct. LXII, 81 L. ed. 1373 (1937).2 *Berkowitz v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 881, 884 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937). It
is pointed out in a note (1939) 52 H~av. L. Rav. 983, that the language, "sentence
shall be imposed without delay" in Rule I, like the language, "motions shall 'be
determined promptly" in Rule II(1), and bills of exceptions "shall be settled as
promptly as possible" in Rule IX, is designed merely to urge despatch upon the
trial courts, and that this is weakened by the possible absence of sanctions, though
possibly mandamus will lie.
29 Pratt v. United States, 102 F. (2d) 275, 278 (U. S. Ct. of App. D. C.
1939). The trial court granted a motion in arrest of judgment because of the
delay and then later vacated it. The appellate court found no jeopardy.
"Berkowitz v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 881, 884 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937),
[Vol. 21
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ond 7 days before and 28 after, in the Third 64 before and 32 after,
in the Fourth 10 before and 2 after, in the Fifth 1 before and 5 after,
in the Sixth 1 before and 8 after, in the Seventh 19 before and 10
after, in the Eighth 5 before and 5 after, in the Ninth 18 before and 11
after, and in the Tenth 13 before and 19 after.31 The language of
Rule I that after verdict the "sentence shall be imposed without delay"
was thus not particularly effective in such cases.
Rule I, paragraph 2. Pending sentence, the court may commit the
defendant or continue or increase the amount of bail.
Where a judgment pronouncing sentence provided that the sentence
should not begin for thirty days the sentence is still pending within the
rule authorizing the court to continue or increase the amount of bail
pending sentence.3 2  The court had control of its judgment and the
potential sentence during that time, and could have modified or set
aside the judgment. The judgment fixing the time for commencing
sentence is at most irregular, and not void. A surety voluntarily
executing a new bond is estopped to question the regularity of the
proceeding.
RULE II. Motions
Rules I and II do not bar nor affect a judgment non obstante
veredicto pursuant to a reserved ruling on a pre-verdict motion. They
govern criminal procedure after verdict of guilt and refer specifically
to post-trial motions. Even if Rules I and II were applicable they
would not limit the procedural power of trial courts. The purpose of
these rules is to force speedy termination of criminal proceedings and
to expedite appeals. They are not made for the benefit of the litigant
who invokes them, but are made to serve the general good by simplify-
ing and expediting trials. Unless the violation of a Rule of Procedure
by the court is fundamental, the litigant should not be allowed to
complain.
33
Rule II (1). Motions after verdict or finding of guilt, or to with-
draw a plea of guilty, shall be determined promptly.
Though Rule II (1) provides that "motions shall be determined
promptly" it is not clear that this result has been obtained. Certain
"x Note (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rsv. 983, 988-992, Tables II-V.
" Berkowitz v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 881, 884 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) (action
by the United States against surety on a forfeited bail bond).
33Ex parte United States, 101 F. (2d) 870, 876, n. 18 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
For the same case in the trial court see United States v. Standard Oil Co., 24 F.
Supp. 575, 579 (W. D. Wis. 1938), taking the same view. Certiorari was granted.
United States v. Stone, 307 U. S. 620, 59 S. Ct. 1044, 83 L. ed. 1499 (1939), and
there was an affirmance by a four to four vote, 308 U. S. 519, 60 S. Ct. 177, 84
L. ed. 441 (1940), motion granted, 60 S. Ct. 583 (1940).
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cases sampled have shown that the time intervals before and after
adoption of the rule in the First Circuit Court were 5 days before and 13
days after, in the Second Circuit 0 days before and 5 after, in the Third
24 before and 36 after, in the Fourth 8 before and 2 after, in the Fifth 16
before and 6 after, in the Sixth 42 before and 4 after, in the Seventh
9 before and 6 after, in the Eighth 11 before and 5 after, in the Ninth
8 before and 8 after, and in the Tenth 10 before and 15 after.
8 4
Rule II (2). Save as provided in subdivision (3) of this Rule,
motions in arrest of judgment, or for a new trial, shall be made
within three (3) days after verdict or finding of guilt.
A motion for new trial filed more than five months after verdict
is made too late.35 A motion made two days after the expiration of
the three-day period is too late, and will not extend the time for taking
an appeal. 36 The fact that the defendant is prevented from filing his
motion for new trial within the time allowed by the rules because of his
incarceration under conviction will not support a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
37
In one case the circuit court stated that Rule II (2) raised a serious
question as to the power of the court to entertain a motion to vacate
and set aside a judgment after the three-day period had elapsed.38 But
the government had not raised that issue, and, since the appeal was not
taken on time, the court felt precluded from considering the point.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus "for time to secure counsel
to make motion for new trial" must show that such motion was made
within the three-day period. Due process does not require that the
trial court see to it that the defendant's attorney move for a new trial.
The attorney may have been of the opinion that the motion would be
useless.3 9
Where a defendant's counsel continued to represent him for more
than three days after verdict was returned, and he filed no motion for
a new trial, in the absence of a showing that any basis existed for such
a motion, the circuit court must assume that defendant's counsel had
concluded that a motion for new trial would be unavailing.
40
"' See note (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 983, 989-992, Tables II-V.
35 Miceli v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 472, 473 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936). No
mention of Rule 11(2) was made in a case involving motion for new trial and in
arrest of judgment made nearly three months after trial, but the motions were
refused. United States v. Peterson et al., 24 F. Supp. 470 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
"O'Gwin v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 494, 495 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) ; accord,
Decker v. United States, 97 F. (2d) 473, 474 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), where motions
in arrest of judgment and for new trial were three days late.
"Vermillion v. Zerbst, 97 F. (2d) 347, 348 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
" United States v. Tousey, 101 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
" De Maurez v. Swope, 104 F. (2d) 758. 759 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939)." Errington v. Hudspeth, 110 F. (2d) 384, 386, 127 A. L. R. 1467 (C. C. A.
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The rule requiring motions for new trial, and in arrest of judgment,
within three days after verdict has resulted in some reduction in delay.
A study has shown as to certain cases sampled that the time interval
between verdict and motion in the Second Circuit was 1 day before
adoption of the rule and 2 days after, in the Third 7 days before and
3 after, in the Fourth 4 before and 1 after, in the Fifth 7 before and 4
after, in the Sixth 78 before and 1 after, in the Seventh 11 before and 4
after, in the Eighth 8 before and 3 after, in the Ninth 8 before and 8
after, and in the Tenth 7 before and 5 after.
41
Rule I1 (3). A motion for a new trial solely upon the ground of
newly-discovered evidence may be made within sixty (60) days
after final judgment, without regard to the expiration of the term
at which judgment was rendered, unless an appeal has been taken
and in that event the trial court may entertain the motion only on
remand of the case by the appellate court for that purpose, and
such remand may be made at any time before final judgment.
On May 31, 1938, the Supreme Court by order amended Rule
11 (3), so as to add at the beginning of the paragraph the words "Ex-
cept in capital cases," and to a'dd at the end of the paragraph the sen-
tence: "In capital cases the motion may be made at any time before
execution of the judgment."
42
A motion to remand a case to the district court for hearing a
motion for new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence could
not be made with respect to a judgment rendered March 30, 1934, since
that was before September 1, 1934, the date made -determinative in the
promulgation of the Rules.
43
In one case an appeal had been taken and final judgment entered
affirming the decision of the lower court. The case was sent back to
the trial court for final disposition. No application for a remand had
been made in the circuit court. It was held that the district court then
had no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground
of newly-discovered evidence because the case had not been remanded
to permit the defendant to make such a motion.
44*
10th, 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 638, 60 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. ed. 1407 (1940)
(appeal from a denial of writ of habeas corpus).
"Note (1939) 52 HARv. L. REV. 983, 989-992, Tables II-V. In the First
Circuit it was 1 day before and 13 after.
2304 U. S. 592, 58 S. Ct. CXXVIII, 82 L. ed. 1561 (1938).
,s Needham v. United States, 73 F. (2d) 1, at 3 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
4* Flowers v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 79, 81 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936). In a case
going to the Supreme Court it was held that after an appeal from a conviction
the district court was without jurisdiction pending the appeal to modify its judg-
ment by resentencing the defendant. Berman v. United States, 302 U. S. 2i 1, 58
S. Ct. 164, 82 L. ed. 204 (1937).
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Though a defendant was convicted on April 19, 1934, thus not com-
ing within the operation of the Criminal Appeals Rules, which covered
only convictions on or after September 1, 1934, the court stated that
it was settled that a district court is without jurisdiction to entertain a
motion for new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence after
the expiration of the term at which the judgment of conviction was
entered.45 The court made no reference to the Criminal Appeals Rules.
However, under the rules the motion, if made in the district court,
is made too late when the sixty-day period has expired.40 A motion
made in the circuit court before the case is argued and submitted, to
remand the case to the district court for determination of a motion for
new trial based on newly-discovered evidence, is timely, even though
made more than sixty days after verdict, since the sixty-day limit does
not apply to motions made in the appellate court. 47 The appellate
court may remand at any time before final judgment.
The circuit court is without power to entertain a motion for new
trial, but may in its discretion remand the case to the trial court for
its consideration of such motion.48 A case will be so remanded only if
showing is made to the appellate court that the lower court would be
justified in granting the new trial.
4 9
An affidavit by an attorney, not shown to have been unavailable as
a witness at the trial, that defendant was insane and the exculpatory
affidavit of a co-defendant will not warrant remand of the case to the
district court for consideration of appellant's motion for new trial on
the ground of his insanity, issue as to which had been raised by his
motion in arrest of judgment.50
The ex parte affidavit of a defendant who was a fugitive when co-
defendants were tried, exonerating co-defendants and assuming blame,
is not sufficient to warrant remand of the case on appeal so that the trial
court might consider the co-defendant's application for new trial based
on newly-discovered evidence.r t The court pointed out that delay at
this stage was -undesirable, and that evidence of this kind was very
weak.
The motion should indicate that it is made on the ground of newly-
4' Buie v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
41 Miceli v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 472, 473 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
4" Hawkins v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 551, 555, cert. denied, 302 U. S. 733,
58 S. Ct. 118, 82 L. ed. 567 (1937).
4 Wagner v. United States, 118 F. (2d) 801, 802 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) ; Evans
v. United States, 122 F. (2d) 461, 468 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
'0 Evans v. United States, 122 F. (2d) 461, 469 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941). The
court cited Isgrig v. United States, 109 F. (2d) 131, 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940),
which was a proceeding for remission of forfeiture of an appearance bond in a
criminal case, but that court cited Civil Rule 59(b).
"o Lee v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 326, 331 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
5' La Belle et at. v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 911, 912 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
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discovered evidence. An application for new trial for newly-discovered
evidence must show diligence, the evidence must be material, not merely
cumulative nor impeaching, and such that it will probably produce an
acquittal.52  Hence, where the affidavits supporting the motion con-
sisted largely of hearsay testimony and impeachment of testimony re-
ceived in the trial, the circuit court would not in its discretion remand
the case to the trial court for its consideration of the motion.
Since the rule does not mention appeal, an appeal may be taken only
within five days after entry of judgment of conviction.5
Rule 11 (4). A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty shall be
made within ten (10) days after entry of such plea and before
sentence is imposed.
Section 1 of the act authorizing the promulgation of the Rules ex-
pressly saved the right to apply for a withdrawal of a plea of guilty
when made within ten days after entry and before sentence.
54
A motion for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty not made before
imposition of sentence will be denied.5 5  In a case where plea of
guilty was entered on January 6, 1939, and motion for leave to with-
draw was noticed for February 6, 1939, but actually heard eleven days
later, it was held too late.5 6 Since the defendant appeared to be trifling
with the court, the court thought it unnecessary to consider "whether
the Rules intended to deprive the court of all power to entertain such a
motion after the lapse of ten days, where the interests of justice might
so require." However, in another case District Judge Yankwich stated
concerning withdrawal of the plea of guilty and the ten-day period
permitted: "After that period, the District Court cannot allow a change
of plea, and the g6vernment acquires the right to have a judgment
follow the plea. The object of this rule was to do away with the rule
previously obtaining which permitted a change of plea 'if for any rea-
son the granting of the privilege seems fair and just,' Kercheval v.
United States, (1927) 274 U. S. 220, 225, 47 S. Ct. 582, 583, 71 L. ed.




"Wagner v. United States, -118. F. (2d) 801, 802 (C. C. A.- 9th, 1941). The
court cited Johnson v. United States, 32 F. (2d) 127, 130 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
See also Evans v. United States, 122 F. (2d) 461, 468 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
" Fewox v. United States, 77 F. (2d) 699, 700 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
" 48 STAT. 399 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A. §723(a) (1941).
" United States v. Schor et al., 13 F. Supp. 399 (E. D. N. Y. 1936), aff'd,
United States v. Balkan, 85 F. (2d) 1020 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). Plea of guilty
was made on December 23, 1935, sentence followed, and on December 31, 1935,
defendants moved for leave to withdraw their plea of guilty.
" United States v. Gotta, 26 F. (2d) 427 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
"Cooke v. Swope, 28 F. Supp. 492, 494 (W. D. Wash. 1939), aff'd, 109 F.
(2d) 955 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
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A plea of nolo contendere is a "plea of guilty" under Rule 11 (4).158
The rule gives no absolute right to withdraw pleas of guilty or of nolo
contendere. The rule simply regulates the limit of time within which
the application to withdraw may be filed. The principles on which with-
drawal may be granted or denied remain unchanged.
When the question concerning whether the defendant had consented
to judgment of conviction by allegedly failing to with-draw a plea of
guilty within the ten days permitted by the rule had not been raised
either in the district court or the circuit court, and was based solely
upon dates of entries in the criminal docket without any supporting
proof, the question would not be considered by the Supreme Court.0
The government had argued that the provision of the rule was man-
datory and that therefore the judgment, as one upon consent, should be
affirmed without consideration of the merits. The defendant answered
that the government by going to trial was estopped to raise the ques-
tion; and that a plea of guilty did not prevent the defendant from chal-
lenging the sufficiency of the indictment.
In one case the circuit court stated that Rule II (4) raised a serious
question as to the power of the court to entertain a motion to vacate
and set aside a judgment after the ten-day period to withdraw a plea
of guilty had elapsed. But the government had not raised the issue,
and, since the appeal was not taken on time, the court felt precluded
from considering the problem.6 0
A contention that the rule is unconstitutional in limiting the time
within which a plea of guilty may be withdrawn as -denying the right
of trial by jury need not be decided when it does not appear that the
defendant at any time sought to withdraw his plea.61
A motion was made to vacate judgment and sentence and to withdraw
a plea of guilty on the grounds that the defendant was insane and under
duress and misrepresentation when he pleaded guilty, was denied assist-
ance of counsel, and was not advised of his right to withdraw his plea
of guilty, and that the court erred in imposing sentence within less than
ten days after the plea. It was held that this motion went to the juris-
-diction of the court and could therefore be raised collaterally on habeas
corpus in any federal court where the defendant was detained, includ-
ing the court rendering the judgment.6 2  The motion to set aside was
" Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F. (2d) 541, 543 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938). The same
is true as to Section 1 of the Act authorizing the Supreme Court to lay down
rules of procedure. 28 U. S. C. A. §723(a) (1941).
" Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 468, 82 L. ed. 607 (1938).
Apparently the withdrawal was permitted eleven days after the entry of the plea.
" United States v. Tousey, 101 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
"lWilliams v. Sanford, 110 F. (2d) 526, 527 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cert. denied,
310 U. S. 643, 60 S. Ct. 1096, 84 L. ed. 1411 (1940).
02 Robinson v. Johnston, 118 F. (2d) 998, 1000 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) (appeal
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in the nature of the writ of error coram nobis, superseded in the federal
courts by a motion addressed to the trial court. Such motion may be
made after the expiration of the time fixed for similar motions by rule
of court.
RULE iii. Appeals
Rule III, paragraph 1. An appeal shall be taken within five (5)
days after entry of judgment of conviction, except that where a
motion for a new trial has been made within the time specified
in subdivision (2) of Rule II, the appeal may be taken within
five (5) days after entry of the order denying the motion.
Petitions for allowance of appeal, and citations, in cases gov-
erned by these rules are abolished.
The appeal provided under the rules must be taken within five days
after entry of judgment of conviction. Hence if an appeal is taken
within five days after the overruling of a motion for new trial made
solely on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, it is barred if not
also taken within five days after the entry of judgment of conviction.
63
The time limit for appeal cannot be extended by moving for new trial
on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. A main purpose of the
rules is to force early termination of criminal cases. A motion friv-
olously made might otherwise allow the defendant sixty-five days in
which to appeal.
The time limit fixed by rule is jurisdictional. 64 The fact that de-
fendant's incarceration prevents him from taking his appeal in the
allotted time is not a basis for a writ of habeas corpus. 65 Where it is
too late for the defendant to appeal on the ground of newly-discovered
evidence, the defendant's remedy, if he is innocent, is to apply to the
President for a pardon.66
from denial of writ of habeas corpus). See Note (1941) 39 MicH. L. REv. 963,
966.
" Fewox v. United States, 77 F. (2d) 699, 700 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935). Where
judgment was entered on June 29, 1935, the time for appeal expired on July 6,
1935. Mookini v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 126, 128 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). See
in accord: Burr v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 502 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936). Sundays
and holidays are excluded from the five-day period. Scott v. United States, 115
F. (2d) 137, 138 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 678, 61 S. Ct.
449, 85 L. ed. 1117 (1941).
"4 The court goes on to say, however: "But, since section 2 of the statute
above referred to preserves the right of appeal as formerly authorized, the over-
ruling of the extraordinary motion may still in a proper case be itself reviewed."
Fewox v. United States, 77 F. (2d) 699, 700 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
In Decker v. United States, 97 F. (2d) 473, 474 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), the
court stated that "the delay in taking the appeal raises a question of jurisdiction
which may not be waived." See also Meyers v. United States, 116 F. (2d) 601,
603 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); Boykin v. Huff, 121 F. (2d) 865, 873 (U. S. Ct. of
App. D. C. 1941). -
" Vermillion v. Zerbst, 97 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
" In re Crum, 94 F. (2d) 746. 747 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
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The five-day rule as to appeal may not be circumvented by taking
an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a portion of a
judgment of conviction and sentence, where the motion was presented
more than a year after entry of judgment, after expiration of term,
and no appeal was taken from the judgment.6 1 The only appeal per-
missible was from the original judgment within five days after its entry.
The applicant's remedy, if any, was by habeas corpus upon termination
of the valid portion of the sentence.
If a motion for new trial is filed after the expiration of the three-
day period, this will not extend the time for taking an appeal as would
a motion filed within the three-day period.
08
The five-day lirit was held in 1937 to apply to criminal contempt
proceedings "9  It was considered immaterial that the defendant was
not entitled to a jury trial, inasmuch as there might have been a plea of
guilty which clearly would have brought the proceeding within the
scope of the Criminal Appeals Rules.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus "for time to secure counsel
to make motion for new trial or to take an appeal" must show that such
motion was made within the five-day period. Due process does not
require that the trial court see to it that the defendant's attorney perfect
an appeal. The attorney may have been of the opinion that the appeal
would be useless. 7 *
Where defendants were sentenced March 14, 1939, no motion for
new trial was filed, and leave to appeal in forma pauperis was granted
April 5, 1939, appeal taken by filing notice of appeal April 5th was not
taken within five days after judgment of conviction, was ineffective,
and motion to dismiss was granted.71
Where judgment of conviction was entered four years before judg-
ment denying motion for resentence, the period for taking the appeal
measured by five days from the entry of judgment of conviction as
"' Dembrofsky v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 677 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936). See
also United States v. Tousey, 101 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Audette v.
United States, 99 F. (2d) 113, 114 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) (rule not mentioned);
Bensen v. United States, 93 F. (2d) 749, 750 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) ; Note (1939)
52 HARV. L. REv. 983, 984.
" O'Gwin v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 494, 495 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937); accord,
Decker v. United States, 97 F. (2d) 473, 474 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
69* Wilson et al. v. Byron Jackson Co., 93 F. (2d) 577, 578 (C. C.. A. 9th,
1937). The court stated that an inspection of the record in Russell v. United
States, 86 F. (2d) 389 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) showed that the appeal had been
taken in accordance with the Criminial Appeals Rules. Prior to the rules three
months were allowed.
De Maurez v. Swope, 104 F. (2d) 758, 759 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939). But it is
pointed out in the case of In re Edwards, 106 F. (2d) 537, 538 (C. C. A. 8th,
1939), that an appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding is not an appeal in a criminal
case.
71 Miller v. United States, 104 F. (2d) 343 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
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stated in Rule III, paragraph 1, is inapplicable. 2 An appeal taken
two days after judgment denying the motion, and one week after de-
fendant was notified in prison of the qiecision, was timely. The court
stated by Judge Sibley: "We are of opinion that the time for taking
this appeal is not limited by any provision of Rule III, and that the time
limit applicable before the rule was made still obtains. Under it the
appeal is in time. The promptness in executing the criminal law sought
by the rule is of no importance here, because the appellant is already
imprisoned. The motion to dismiss is denied."
This doctrine was followed by Federal Circuit Judge Bratton in a
case where the sentence was in 1936, defendant's motion to vacate the
judgment was denied on August 4, 1941, and the notice of appeal was
filed fifteen days later.73  The court referred to the first two sections
of the act authorizing the Supreme Court to lay down rules of criminal
appellate procedure and to Rule III. It was held that Rule III applies
to the taking of an appeal from a judgment of conviction, but not to
an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate the judgment of
conviction. On May 25, 1942, the Supreme Court held that the failure
to make provision in the Criminal Appeals Rules for appealing an order
tiisnissing a petition to correct a sentence was "casus omissus." This
left in full force the provision, of the Judiciary Act requiring applica-
tion for allowance of appeals to the circuit court to be made within three
months after entry of the order appealed from.
74
A letter written by an indigent defendant within the time allowed
for appeal, informing the trial court of the desire to appeal and of un-
certainty regarding intentions of assigned and volunteer counsel, could
be regarded as sufficient to constitute taking an appeal, though it also
expressed hope that counsel would take appeal formally, and though it
did not contain all details specified in applicable rules.75 The letter was
a safeguard against the anticipated failure of counsel to appeal. It set
forth the essential things, namely, the identity of the cause and of the
appellant and the intention to appeal. Neither the government nor the
court could have been misled or prejudiced by any of the omissions.
The rule requiring appeals to be taken within five days after con-
viction has resulted in considerable reduction in delay. A study has
shown as to certain cases sampled that the time interval between sen-
' Meyers v. United States, 116 F. (2d) 601, 603 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
*' Gilmore v. United States, 124 F. (2d) 537, 539 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942). The
court relied on Meyers v. United States, 116 F. (2d) 601, 603 (C. C. A. 5th,
1941).
7 United States ex rel. Coy v. United States et al., - U. S. -, 62 S. Ct.
1137, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1052 (1942). For same case in the district court
see, 38 F. Supp. 610 (W. D. Ky. 1941); and in the circuit court, 124 F. (2d)
1019 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
"Boykin v. Huff, 121 F. (2d) 865, 873 (U. S. Ct. of App. D. C. 1941).
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tence and appeal was in the First Circuit 47 days before the rule and 3
days after adoption of the rule, in the Second 21 days before adoption
and 3 after, in the Third 3 days before and 5 after, in the Fourth 4
before and 2 after, in the Fifth 30 before and 7 after, in the Sixth 38
before and 4 after, in the Seventh 31 before and 5 after, in the Eighth
19 before and 4 after, in the Ninth 5 before and 2 after, and in the
Tenth 18 before and 3 after.'
Rule III, paragraph 3. Appeals shall be taken by filing with the
clerk of the trial court a notice, in duplicate, stating that the
defendant appeals from the judgment, and by serving a copy of
the notice upon the United States Attorney. The notice of appeal
shall set forth the title of the case, the names and addresses of
the appellant and appellant's attorney, a general statement of the
nature of the offense, the date of the judgment, the sentence im-
posed, and, if the appellant is in custody, the prison where appel-
lant is confined. The notice shall also contain a succinct statement
of the grounds of appeal and shall follow substantially the form
hereto annexed.
According to Chief Justice Hughes, the "fundamental policy of the
Criminal Appeals Rules is that as speedily as possible, upon the taking
of the appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals shall be vested with the
jurisdiction to see that the appeal is properly expedited and to supervise
and control all proceedings on the appeal."77 For this purpose the rules
provide that the notice of appeal shall be filed in duplicate with the
clerk of the trial court and a copy of the notice served upon the United
States Attorney. And, by Rule IV, paragraph 1, it becomes the duty
of the clerk of the trial court immediately to forward the duplicate notice
of appeal to the clerk of the appellate court.
Where an objection was not called to the attention of the trial court,
either in the notice of appeal containing a statement of the grounds of
appeal as provided in Rule III, paragraph 3, nor in the assignment of
errors, the circuit court will generally decline to examine the question. 78
Where the record failed to indicate that a copy of the notice was
served upon the United States Attorney, as required by Rule III, pAra-
graph 3, the court refused to explore the effect of such omission in the
absence of a motion to dismiss the appeal.79
A letter by an indigent defendant informing the trial court of a
7 Note (1939) 52 HAnv. L. REv. 983, 989-992, Tables II-V.
"'Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 163, 57 S. Ct. 700, 703, 81 L. ed. 976,
981 (1937).
"n United Cigar Whelan Stores Corp. v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 340, 346
(C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
" Scott v. United States, 115 F. (2d) 137, 138 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
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desire to appeal is not ineffective under the circumstances because the
letter was filed with the judge rather than the clerk, since the latter is
merely an arm of the court. There was a substantial compliance with
the rule.80 The filing of the letter was not ineffective because the
defendant did not tender the five-dollar filing fee required by statute
and rules. Upon the receipt of the letter the court should have in-
formed the defendant that, if he wished to appeal in his own person,
this fee should be paid to the clerk, but instead the court made no reply
until the time allowed for taking appeal had expired. It made no dif-
ference that the court apparently regarded the letter as an application
for leave to appeal in foru pauperis.
RULE IV. Control by Appellate Court
Rule IV, paragraph 1. The clerk of the trial court shall imme-
diately forward the duplicate notice of appeal to the clerk of the
appellate court, together with a statement from the docket entries
in the case substantially as provided in the form hereto annexed.
Chief Justice Hughes states concerning Rule IV, paragraph 1: "By
rule 4 it becomes the duty of the clerk of the trial court immediately
to forward the duplicate notice of appeal to the clerk of the appellate
court, together with a statement from the docket entries in the case
substantially as provided in the form annexed to the Rules. This is a
ministerial duty which the clerk of the trial court must perform."
81
Rule IV, paragraph 2. From the time of the filing with its clerk
of the duplicate notice of appeal, the appellate court shall, subject
to these rules, have supervision and control of the proceedings on
the appeal, including the proceedings relating to the preparation
of the record on appeal.
The appeal is perfected and complete control of the case is vested
in the circuit court when the duplicate notice of appeal and the state-
ment of the essential docket entries are forwarded by the clerk of the
trial court to the circuit court.8 2
The Supreme Court interpreted Rules IV and IX as giving the
circuit court wide powers of control over criminal appeals in the leading
case of Ray v. United States.8 While the powers of the trial judge
"° Boykin v. Huff, 121 F. (2d) 865, 873 (U. S. Ct. of App. D. C. 1941), noted
(1941) 27 IoVA L. REv. 133, (1941) 14 RocKY MT. L. REv. 69, (1942) 27 WASH.
U. L. Q. 272.
" 'Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 163, 57 S. Ct. 700, 703, 81 L. ed. 976,
981 (1937). The case came up on certiorari."2 Simmons v. United States, 89 F. (2d) 591, 595 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937).
83301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 81 L. ed. 976 (1937). See also Forte v. United
States, 302 U. S. 220, 58 S. Ct. 180, 82 L. ed. 209 (1937) ; Kay v. United States,
303 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 468, 82 L. ed. 607 (1938). In the last case the Supreme
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are strictly limited under Rule IX, the circuit court is given full author-
ity to set aside or modify his orders when there has been an abuse of
discretion, or the interests of justice require it, and therefore can extend
the time granted by the trial judge. The circuit court under Rule IX,
paragraph 4, may send back a bill of exceptions to the trial judge for
correction under its direction into condensed and narrative form. Super-
vision and control of the circuit court over the preparation of the bill
calls for the exercise of sound judicial discretion and its action will
not be reviewed unless it appears that this discretion has been abused.
In the case actually before the court, the defendant, convicted of viola-
tion of the mail fraud and conspiracy statute, wds granted four months
within which to file his bill of exceptions, and after unsuccessful efforts
to obtain agreement for condensation of the evidence, or an extension
of time, procured the trial judge to settle the stenographer's minutes
as a bill of exceptions. The circuit court refused to grant further time
or to return the bill of exceptions to the trial judge for correction. This
was held to be no abuse of discretion.
It was also held in Ray v. United States that the clause in Rule IV,
paragraph 2, providing that the appellate court's supervision and con-
trol shall be "subject to these rules" refers to the rules governing the
action of the appellate court, and not those governing the trial court.
To make effective this supervision and control, any matter requiring
correction may be brought before the appellate court upon the short
notice of five days, as provided in Rule IV, paragraph 3. There may
be not only a motion to 'dismiss the appeal, but "for directions to the
trial court" and "to vacate or modify any order made by the trial court
or by any judge in relation to the prosecution of the appeal." This
includes orders fixing the time for settlement and filing of the bill of
exceptions. The government may show the appellate court that the
time fixed is too long; and the defendant may claim that the time fixed
is too short.8 4
That appellant's failure to have a bill of exceptions settled and filed
on time was not brought to the circuit court's attention until it had
heard argument and reached a decision will not preclude it from there-
after exercising its supervisory powers in regard to such settlement and
filing.85 The court may in its sound discretion refuse to strike the bill
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the cause in order that the circuit
court could exercise its discretion because the circuit court might have proceeded
upon the assumption that it had no power to act.
For a statement of the law prior to the rules see Walker v. United States,
113 F. (2d) 314, 317 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
",Accord, Forte v. United States, 302 U. S. 220, 58 S. Ct. 180, 82 L. ed. 209
(1937).
"'Forte v. United States, 302 U. S. 220, 58 S. Ct. 180, 82 L. ed. 209 (1937).
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of exceptions and may approve the previous filing and settlement thereof.
It would be a mere idle form to extend the time and return the bill of
exceptions for settlement accordingly.
Without referring to any specific rule, it has been held that the cir-
cuit court may allow the amendment of the bill of exceptions to include
the motion for a directed verdict, ruling of the trial court thereon, and
exceptions, where they had not been incorporated in the bill."'
Also without referring to any specific rule, the court held that assum-
ing that "it is a doubtful question whether or not a second order extend-
ing the time for settling the bill of exceptions may be made within 30
days after the appeal is taken in a criminal case, we would be inclined
to exercise our supervisory authority over the settlement of the bill."
87
It is not necessary that the circuit court, when in recess, convene
to grant extension of time in which to settle the bill of exceptions. 8
Extension may be properly granted by a single judge though the term
"appellate court" is used.
The discretionary power of the appellate court to extend the time
for settling and filing the bill of exceptions will not be exercised where
the bill contains 23 pages, all but one of which are occupied with in-
structions given to the jury and the exceptions thereto, and there was a
delay of about eight months between the sentence and the proposal of
the bill of exceptions.89
After the thirty-day period allowed in Rule IX has elapsed without
an extension having been timely granted by the district court or by the
appellate court under Rule IV, the district court is without power to
settle and sign the bill of exceptions.o*
When no motion to extend the time for filing has been made in the
circuit court, the court said in one case that "on the record presented
we are not inclined to act sua sponte."'
91
While the bill of exceptions should show on its face that it was
settled within the time fixed by law and such fact may be shown in the
8 Reiner v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). The court
said that the amending might be done by stipulation of the parties. If they could
not agree, the trial judge was then authorized and directed to amend. The court
cited Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 81 L. ed. 976 (1937)." Noland v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 820, 821 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
88 United States v. Freundlich, 95 F. (2d) 376, 380 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
"Long v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 482, 484 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), rehearing
denied. But the court stated that the examination of the record presented by the
appellant satisfied it that there had been no miscarriage of justice. The court
cited Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 777, 81 L. ed. 976 (1937).
G8* Evans v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 851, 852 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). This was
held true though the attention of the district judge was 'not called to the petition
for extension forwarded to him within the thirty-day period until after the
expiration of the period, and though the district judg signed a nunc pro tunc
order extending the time to present the bill.
"Holt v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 90, 94 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937).
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certificate of the trial judge approving and settling the bill, the appellate
court need not accept such assertion of jurisdiction when contrary to
fact, particularly in view of the fact that the appellate court has super-
visory control over the settlement of the bill of exceptions and the
preparation of the record in criminal appeals.92  Hence the appellate
court might call upon the clerk of the district court to certify the orders
of extension. It could order the trial court to include the orders grant-
ing extension of time in the bill of exceptions. 93
Judge Learned Hand states that he understands Ray v. United
States94 to hold that after an appeal is taken, the circuit court "has
always power to control the time of settling the bill.""5  Therefore, in
a case where the defendant was sentenced on July 2nd, and time for
settling the bill was extended on July 19th by consent to October 1st
(though not by the judge who tried the case, who was possibly absent),
and on September 17th a further extension to November was granted
by a judge of the circuit court over opposition of the district attorney,
and on October 19th there was a still further extension to December 1st
by a judge of the circuit court by consent, and the bill was not finally
settled until December 7th, Judge Hand held that the defendant had
not been guilty of any conduct or inaction which forfeited his rights
and that the circuit court would consider the bill. The circuit court
stated that even though the -defendant had done nothing at all to settle
the bill, "as mere matter of power we should be able to let him settle
at any time."
The lodging of a proposed bill of exceptions with the clerk on the
final day of an extended period for settling and filing does not con-
stitute compliance with Rule IX, where the bill was not finally settled
and filed until more than two months later. Yet the reviewing court
may extend the time for filing the bill to embrace the period during
which it appears to have been filed, in order to determine whether there
has been a miscarriage of justice, particularly where the district attorney
does not ask the reviewing court to strike the bill.98
Where counsel for defendants neglect their clients' case and leave
them uninformed, if not actually misled, with respect to the status of
the appeal which was not perfected, i.e., filed and settled within the time
92Long v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 482, 484 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), rehearing
denied.
"' The court cited Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 81 L. ed.
976 (1937).
-1 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 81 L. ed. 976 (1937).
" United States v. Freundlich, 95 F. (2d) 376, 380 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). The
court referred to both Rules IV and IX.
"' Sanford v. United States, 98 F. (2d) 325, 326 (App. D. C. 1938). The
court cited Forte v. United States, 302 U. S. 220, 223, 58 S. Ct. 180, 182, 82 L. ed.
209, 212 (1937).
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limited therefor, the circuit court would in its discretion permit the
defendant to file assignments of error and a bill of exceptions at a later
date.9 7 The court stated that every case stands on its own facts.
A circuit court in one case denied a motion to strike a bill of ex-
ceptions allegedly settled one day after the expiration of the extended
time for settling the bill.98 The court stated that it acted in the exercise
of its discretion in order to prevent injustice.
Where notice of appeal was given on December 8, 1937, and the
district court attempted to enlarge the time for filing the bill of ex-
ceptions by orders dated February 9 and March 8, 1938, the latter
order extending the time for sixty days, and yet the bill was not filed
until May 23, 1938, the circuit court dismissed an appeal.9 9 Five months
had elapsed and no compelling reasons in favor of the defendant existed.
Where defendant wrote a letter informing the trial court of a desire
to appeal, and under the circumstances the failure of the trial court to
inform the defendant of his right to appeal in propria persona in effect
prevented the defendant from taking steps to perfect the record and
properly present the appeal, the circuit court is authorized on applica-
tion by the defendant to order that the record be prepared and presented
for consideration.'Go
Under Rule IV, paragraph 2, in conjunction with Rules IX and
XII, a circuit court may lay down rules relating to the assignment of
errors.
0 1
Rule IV, paragraph 3. The appellate court may at any time, upon
five (5) days' notice, entertain a motion to dismiss the appeal, or
for directions to the trial court, or to vacate or modify any order
made by the trial court or by any judge in relation to the prose-
cution of the appeal, including any order for the granting of bail.
Where there is no apparent effort to prepare the record, and it is
not in fact timely filed, the court may apply the provision of Rule IV
that "The appellate court may at any time, upon five (5) days' notice,
entertain a motion to dismiss the appeal."' 02  Where, in its order on
"H annon v. United States, 99 F. (2d) 933, 934 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938). The
court referred also to rules VI and IX."s Mackreth v. United States, 103 F. (2d) 495, 496 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the time for settling had actually
expired. The court cited Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 468, 82
L. ed. 607 (1938).
"' Miller v. United States, 104 F. (2d) 97, 98 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939). (The
court also cited Rule IX.)
""Boykin v. Huff, 121 F. (2d) 865, 873 (App. D. C. 1941). The court cited
Forte v. United States, 302 U. S. 220, 223, 59 S. Ct. 180, 182, 82 L. ed. 209, 212
(1937)."'1 Walker v. United States, 116 F. (2d) 458, 463 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
'"*Weber v. United States, 104 F. (2d) 300, 301 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
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the docket of the circuit court, the criminal case was called on April 11,
and there was no record filed, time for filing having expired April 5th,
and there was no application for relief, no brief, and no counsel present,
dismissal for want of prosecution was justified.
RULE V. Supersedeas
An appeal from a judgment of conviction stays the execution
of the judgment, unless the defendant pending his appeal shall
elect to enter upon the service of his sentence.
On October 21, 1940, the Supreme Court by order amended Rule V
to read: "An appeal from a judgment of conviction stays the execution
of the judgment, unless the defendant pending his appeal shall elect
to enter upon the service of his sentence. The trial court or the Circuit
Court of Appeals may stay the execution of any sentence to pay a fine
or fine and costs upon such terms as it may deem proper. It may re-
quire the defendant pending the appeal to pay to the clerk in escrow
the whole or any part of such fine and costs, to submit to an examina-
tion as to his assets, or to give a supersedeas bond, and it may likewise
make any appropriate order to restrain the defendant from dissipating
his assets and thereby preventing the collection of such fine.
°103
An appeal operates as a supersedeas unless the -defendant elects to
begin serving his sentence 0 4* Commitment of the defendant to the
penitentiary in execution of sentence pending appeal is error since the
defendant is entitled to go at large on bail until final judgment, and on
failure to furnish bond he could only be deprived of liberty until such
final judgment, usually by detention in jail.10 5 The defendant cannot
without his consent be put in a penitentiary in execution of his sentence
until that time.
Where the defendant, upon entry of an order directing commitment
to the penitentiary obtained permission to remain in the county jail at
the place where the order was entered in order that he might render
assistance to counsel in preparation of an appeal from a denial of the
writ of habeas corpus, the defendant was not entitled to have the time
spent in jail, prior to incarceration in the penitentiary after adverse
decision on appeal, applied as a credit on his sentence. The court stated
..0 311 U. S. 731, 61 S. Ct. CLII, 85 L. ed. 90 (1940).
04* Simmons v. United States, 89 F. (2d) 591, 594 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937)
(rehearing denied). The law prior to this rule is stated in Tinkoff v. United
States, 86 F. (2d) 591, 594 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937). Under such prior rule, a
supersedeas could be obtained by serving the writ within the time prescribed
without giving security, provided that the judge who signed the citation directed
that the writ should operate as a supersedeas. Supersedeas was thus discretionary.
100Tinkoff v. Zerbst, 80 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) (prisoner was
given release on bail bond for forty days to endeavor to obtain correction of
alleged errors in the trial court).
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that this conclusion found support "in the spirit of Rule 5."106* The
defendant's request amounted to an election not to enter upon the
service of the sentence.
The late Federal Circuit Judge Rufus E. Foster in an address to
the Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit pointed out that an appel-
lant not on bail has the right, unless he waives it, to remain in the local
jail in custody of the marshal.'
0 7
RULE VI. Bail
The defendant shall not be admitted to bail pending an appeal
from a judgment of conviction save as follows: Bail may be
granted by the trial judge or by the appellate court, or, where the
appellate court is not in session, by any judge thereof or by the
circuit justice.
Bail shall not be allowed pending appeal unless it appears that
the appeal involves a substantial question which should be deter-
mined by the appellate court.
Rule VI has the force and effect of a statute and was promulgated
"for the purpose of expediting the disposition of appeals in criminal
cases."
108
As a preliminary to application for bail in the circuit court, a de-
fendant must first apply to the trial judge unless good cause is shown
for not doing so. In a case before Judges Learned Hand, Chase, and
Charles E. Clark the court in a per curiam opinion stated:
"While we cannot find that any court has construed these words,
we think their meaning is clear. Verbally, it is true, the defendant
may apply in the first instance either to the trial judge or to the circuit
court of appeals if it is in session; and it might even be held that having
applied to one, he must be content. We do not so understand the rule;
rather we think it means that he may apply to both. That being so, it
is obviously desirable that he shall first apply to the trial judge, who
necessarily knows more of the case than the circuit court of appeals
can learn, certainly while the record remains in the district court, as it
almost always does. His ruling will help us greatly; particularly if
he states why he does not think the appeal raises any 'substantial ques-
tion which should be reviewed.' In that event, the defendant will have
to satisfy us that the judge's reasoned conclusion should not prevail, and
" DeMarois v. Hudspeth, 99 F. (2d) 274, 275 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938), cert.
denied. 305 U. S. 656, 59 S. Ct. 360, 83 L. ed. 425 (1939). Note that an appeal
in a habeas corpus case is thus treated like an appeal in a criminal case.
17 Foster, Criminal Appeals Rules, (1939) 1 Fed. Rules Dec. 261, 262.
... Berkowitz v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 881, 884 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937)
(action by United States against surety on a forfeited bail bond).
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we shall not be left in a welter of assertion and counter-assertion in
affidavits from which we have no adequate means of emerging."'109
Rule VI confers jurisdiction on the circuit court once an appeal has
been taken.L10 Rule VI does not confer power to 'dispose of the appeal.
Regardless of what was done under Rule VI the defendant would be
compelled to go on with the preparation of his bill of exceptions. Hence
where the defendant had been without money or counsel, had appealed,
and, being unable to procure bail, had been in custody since sentence,
and no bill of exceptions had been prepared, a writ of habeas corpus
was necessary to complete exercise of appellate jurisdiction of the cir-
cuit court, and such court would entertain the writ to review questions
of the district court's jurisdiction.
RULE vii. Directions for prepa)-ation of record on appeal
The clerk of the trial court shall immediately notify the trial
judge of the filing of the notice of appeal, and thereupon the trial
judge shall at once direct the appellant or his attorney, and the
United States attorney, to appear before him and shall give such
directions as may be appropriate with respect to the preparation
of the record on appeal, including directions for the purpose of
making promptly available all necessary transcripts of testimony
and proceedings. The action and directions contemplated by this
Rule may be had and given by the trial judge at any place he may
designate within the judicial district where the conviction was had.
The initiative in many matters, especially in those relating to the
preparation of the record, is placed upon the trial judge or the clerk of
the trial court.:1 Under Rule VII it is made the duty of the trial
judge to "at once direct the appellant or his attorney, and the United
States attorney, to appear before him," and to "give such directions as
may be appropriate with respect to the preparation of the record on
appeal."
In one case where there was a motion for giving directions as re-
quired by Rule VII, the court stated: "In regard to giving directions
as required by Rule VII, the attorney for defendant may present a
statement, or index, of his proposed record on appeal and I will give
the necessary directions.""'
109 United States v. Hansell, 107 F. (2d) 613 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
110 United States ex rel. McMann v. Adams, 126 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 2d,
1942), cert. granted April 30, 1942, - U. S. -, 62 S. Ct. 1048, 86 L. ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 937. (Habeas corpus proceedings were brought in the circuit court.)
" Boykin v. Huff, 121 F. (2d) 865, 873 (App. D. C. 1941).2112 United States v. Strewl, 28 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
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RULE VIII. Record on appeal without bill of exceptions
When it appears that the appeal is to be prosecuted upon the
clerk's record of proceedings, that is, upon thJ indictment and
other pleadings and the orders, opinions, and judgment of the
trial court, without a bill of exceptions, the trial judge shall direct
the appellant to file with the clerk of the trial court, within a time
stated, an assignment of the errors of which he complains (which
may amplify or add to the grounds stated in the notice of appeal),
and shall direct the clerk to forward promptly, with his certificate,
to the appellate court the above-mentioned record and assignment
of errors, and upon receipt thereof the appellate court shall at
once set the appeal for argument as provided in these rules.
The circuit court has said that it can hear an appeal upon the indict-
ment, pleadings, orders, opinions, and judgment of the trial court,
notwithstanding that there is no bill of exceptions.1"3 The court stated
that perhaps the word "orders" opened to its review an order made
before trial denying a motion to suppress certain documents seized from
the possession of two of the defendants by what they asserted to be an
unlawful search. But it added that without the bill of exceptions it
had no means of knowing how important the papers were, whether any
of them were used at the trial, or whether they could have affected the
result. Hence the court could not reverse the convictions.
When the appeal is under Rule VIII the circuit court is limited in
its consideration to the "sufficiency of the indictment and the judgment
of the court below."'1 4 The record will contain no bill of exceptions."15
The "clerk's record" described in Rule VIII consists of the indict.
ment and other pleadings, and the trial court's orders, opinions, and
judgment.ll&* Where the trial court denied a plea of former acquittal,
and the purported indictment, order, and verdict in the prior prosecu-
tion were neither included in the clerk's record nor incorporated in a
bill of exceptions, but were certified by the clerk and forwarded to the
circuit court, they could not be considered by the circuit court.
Rule VIII, like Rule IX, expressly requires an assignment of
errors.117 Noncompliance with such requirement warrants a dismissal.
.. United States v. Adamowicz, 82 F. (2d) 288, 289 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
't' United States v. Kay, 89 F. (2d) 19, 21 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
Fleisher v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 404, 406 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937).
*t6 Ross v. United States, 102 F. (2d) 113, 114 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939). Without
referring to any rule the court stated iii Lewis v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 952,
953 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937) : "The record proper in a criminal case consists of the
pleadings, process, verdict, and judgment. It does not embrace interlocutory
motions and rulings thereon, especially where the motion is supported by affidavits
or evidence." It has been pointed out that Rule VIII omits mention of the verdict
as a part of the formal record. Note (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rav. 983, 985, note 20.
217Dreher v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 859, 860 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). The
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RuLE ix. Bill of exceptions
Rule IX, paragraph 1. In cases other than those described in
Rule VIII, the appellant, within thirty (30) days after the taking
of the appeal, or within such further time as within said period
of thirty days may be fixed by the trial judge, shall procure to be
settled, and shall file with the clerk of the court in which the case
was tried, a bill of exceptions setting forth the proceedings upon
which the appellant wishes to rely in addition to those shown by
the clerk's record as described in Rule VIII. Within the same
time, the appellant shall file with the clerk of the trial court an
assignment of the errors of which appellant complains. The bill
of exceptions shall be settled by the trial judge as promptly as
possible, and he shall give no extension of time that is not re-
quired in the interest of justice.
Rule IX governs the settlement of the bill of exceptions.118 A court
may not settle in violation of the rule. Where the bill of exceptions is
not settled within the time prescribed by the rules, the circuit court
cannot consider what took place at the trial even though the appellee
consentsl*9* But, Rule IX does not affect the power of the appellate
court, if plain error vital to the defendant has been committed, to notice
and correct such error on appeal, notwithstanding the absence of ob-
jection and exception.
12 0
Federal Circuit Judge Woodrough has stated: "The rule does not
descend to particulars as to the time within which the appellant must
prepare the bill of exceptions, or the time to be allowed the District
Attorney to examine and make objections, or for presentation and rul-
ings on objections, or for the making of amendments and resubmission
to the District Attorney and the court. It deals broadly with the fixing
(within 30 days from taking appeal) of a time within which everything
court stated that this was a continuation of an old requirement, citing 28 U. S.
C. A. 861a, 861b, 862, and 880.
... Pinkussohn v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 70, 71 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
""O*United States v. Adamowicz, 82 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert.
denied, 298 U. S. 664, 56 S. Ct. 748, 80 L. ed. 1388 (1935). The court left un-
decided the question whether under Rule IX the trial judge had power to grant
more than one extension. The court implied that "settling" the bill is not the
same as "filing and serving" it. The appellants had gotten a series of orders from
a judge of the circuit court ex parte extending the time to "file and serve" their
bill of exceptions. In accord as to consent of parties see Wainer v. United States,
87 F. (2d) 77, 80 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 669, 57 S. Ct. 511
(1936) ; United States v. Kay, 89 F. (2d) 19, 21 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
"0 Meadow v. United States, 82 F. (2d) 881, 884 (App. D. C. 1936). But
see the view of Robb, J., dissenting, 82 F. (2d) 881, 885, at 886. It is stated in
Walker v. United States, 116 F. (2d) 458, 463 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940), that assign-
ments of errors under Rule IX must be filed in certain types of cases.
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shall be done in order that the bill shall be settled and filed with the
clerk of court.' ' 121*
Where a motion was made to strike a bill of exceptions "on the
ground that it was not signed within the period first fixed for that pur-
pose, and that no extension of that period was permissible after the
expiration of the thirty days allowed by Rule IX of the Criminal
Appeals Rules of the Supreme Court," the court stated that it need
not pass on such motion in that case, but that it "would seem to be
well grounded."'
1 22 .
A year later it was held that assignments of errors and bill of ex-
ceptions not filed with the clerk of the trial court within thirty days
after the taking of an appeal, nor within a further time fixed within
such period of thirty days, should be stricken.' *  A second order of
extension must be entered within the thirty days after the appeal was
taken.
An order by the trial judge made fifty days after the appeal was
taken, extending the time for filing the bill of exceptions for a thirty-
day period, is not permitted by the rule.12 4  There is a second lapse or
hiatus when the bill is not filed within the thirty-day period given by
the order extending the time for filing. Not only must the order ex-
tending time be made within the thirty-day period, but such order must
fix the time within which the bill should be settled and filed.' 2 5 *  The
Sl*Wolpa v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 829, 831, 832 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936)
(dissenting opinion). For a discussion of the law prior to the Rule, see the
opinion of Federal Circuit Judge Foster in In re Lee, 87 F. (2d) 142, 143 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1936). The trial judge could extend during the term, or within the ek-
tended period, if additional time was granted, and in extraordinary cases delay
beyond the time granted might be excused. The court cited In re Bills of Ex-
ceptions, 37 F. (2d) 849 (C. C A. 6th, 1930).
""*White et al. v. United States, 80 F. (2d) 515, 516 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
The court stated that it need not pass on the motion since it was satisfied from
the matter appearing in the bill of exceptions that the judgment appealed from
should be affirmed. For the law prior to the Rule see cases cited in Note (1939)
52 HARv. L. REv. 983, 985, note 19.
"-2* Yep v. United States, 81 F. (2d) 637, 638 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936). The
court, nevertheless, examined the bill of exceptions, but found no prejudicial error.
Later, on rehearing, the judgment was reversed, and it was held that the bill of
exceptions would be considered where the order of the trial court certified to
the circuit court showed that the bill had been filed within the extended time
granted by the circuit court. Yep v. United States, 83 F. (2d) 41, 42 (C. C. A.
10th, 1936).
"' Gallagher v. United States, 82 F. (2d) 721, 722 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936)
(appeal taken on April 4, 1935; bill of exceptions was filed on October 3, 1935).
The court stated that as an act of grace it had carefully read and examined the
record in the case, and was fully satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to
warrant the finding of the jury.
1' Wolpa v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 829, 831 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) (Wood-
rough, J., dissenting). This is true, though the defendant tendered a proper form
of order to the trial judge and the judge then proceeded to change such order
and hand down an improper one. The defendant should have excepted to the
court's order and petitioned for a writ of mandamus. The trial court used the
word "present" instead of "settle." The defendants alleged the court's use of
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court cannot reserve jurisdiction to make another order after the thirty
days have expired fixing the time of filing and settling. Neither sev-
eral orders nor merely one may be made after the thirty-day period.
Where additional extensions are granted they must be granted
within the extended time and not after such extended time has ended.120
But other cases seem clearly to hold that the second or subsequent
extensions must be made within thirty days after the appeal was
taken.12 7  The trial court may not correct its order entered within the
proper time to fix a longer period than was first fixed, if no such period
"present" was confusing. The motion to strike the bill of objections was sus-
tained. The court cited, in addition to paragraph 1 of Rule IX, paragraph 3 of
the same rule.
For other cases of improper delay in settling and filing bills of exceptions
see Clark v. United States, 108 F. (2d) '969 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1940) cert. denied,
309 U. S. 668, 60 S. Ct. 609, 84 L. ed. 1015 (1940) ; Miller v. United States, 104
F. (2d) 97, 98 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) ; 'Holt v. United States, 106 F. (2d) 684, 685
(C. C. A. 10th, 1939) ; Holt v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 90, 94 (C. C. A. 10th,
1937) (addendum to transcript) ; Drecker v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 859, 860
(C. C. A. 9th, 1937) (one day default) ; Evans v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 851,
852 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) ; Long v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 482, 483 (C. C. A.
9th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 730, 58 S. Ct. 55, 82 L. ed. 564 (1937) ; United
States v. Kay, 89 F. (2d) 19, 21 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), remandecd in Kay v. United
States, 303 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 468, 82 L. ed. 748 (1937); Hightower v. United
States, 88 F. (2d) 302 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) ; Wainer v. United States, 87 F. (2d)
77, 79 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 669, 57 S. Ct. 511, 81. L. ed.
876 (1936) ; Cusamano v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 132 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) ;
Spero v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S.
601, 57 S. Ct. 193, 81 L. ed. 876 (1936) ; Slade v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 786
(C. C. A. 10th, 1936) ; Cary v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 461, 462 (C. C. A. 9th,
1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 659, 57 S. Ct. 435, 81 L. ed. 868 (1936) ; St. Charles
v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 463, 464 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) ; Goddard v. United
States, 86 F. (2d) 884, 885 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) ; United States v. Ray, 86 F.
(2d) 942, 944 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; Miceli v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 472, 473
(C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; Fitzpatrick v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 471, 472 (C. C. A.
7th, 1936) ; Young v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 305 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936).
120 Fierman v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1936), afirming
United States v. Fierman et al., 13 F. Supp. 774, 775 (M. D. Pa., 1936). The
court seems to hold that it is immaterial that extensions are made after the thirty
days following the taking of the appeal. On December 30, 1935, which was
within the thirty-day limit, the time for filing was extended to January 25, 1936.
On January 25, 1936, the time was again extended to February 10, 1936. On
February 10, 1936, the time was extended to February 20, 1936. On February 27,
1936, the time was extended to March 15, 1936. The case is cited as contrary to
a long list of cases in Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 702,
note 1, 81 L. ed. 976 (1937).
2
2TSlade v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 786, 787 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936). The
defendant took an appeal on December 10, 1935. On January 4, 1936, the trial
court extended the time for filing and settling to February 1, 1936. On that date
the trial court extended to March 1, 1936. The second order was held ineffectual.
See also Cary v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 461, 462 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) in which
the court states that dicta in Fierman v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1936), "suggests a contrary holding, but is not an adjudication to that effect";
St. Charles v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 463, 464 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) ; Clark v.
United States, 108 F. (2d) 969 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1940), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 668,
60 S. Ct. 409, 84 L. ed. 1015 (1940). The question was raised but not decided in
Noland v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 820, 821 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
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was then actually fixed due to the omission or error of counsel. 128 The
extension of the term of court will not change the result so as to help
the defendant.
12
The Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes finally
held that Rule IX limited the power of the trial judge to grant exten-
sions.180 The purpose of the rule is to expedite appeals and therefore
to end long delays due to extensions of time to prepare bills of excep-
tions. The rule presupposes that the trial judge is in a position to esti-
mate the time needed to prepare and file the bill, and he is given thirty
days after the taking of the appeal to fix that time. That is the limit
of his authority, save as he may act under the direction of the circuit
court.
In a case coming up to the Supreme Court on certificate from the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the following question
was certified: "When, in a criminal case, a bill of exceptions has, within
thirty days after the taking of an appeal, been prepared, agreed to by
counsel for the United States, and 'submitted' by filing with the clerk
of the District Court, but when the trial judge does not settle and file
the bill within said thirty days, but does settle and sign the same there-
after, is the bill of exceptions properly settled and signed?" The answer
of the Supreme Court was "No."''
31
The mere preparation of a proposed bill of exceptions and the lodg-
ing of it with the clerk before the expiration of the thirty-day or ex-
tended period is not a compliance with Rule IX, where the bill was not
settled and filed until more than two months later.
32
An addendum to a transcript of the record signed by the judge after
the time for filing has expired cannot be considered, as the trial court
had lost jurisdiction to settle the addendum.
133
The "trial judge" referred to in Rule IX means the judge who tried
the case, or, in case of his absence from the district, or disability or
death, any other judge assigned to hold, or holding, the court in which
the case was tried.18 4 Where the judge who tried the case is not absent
128 Slade v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 786, 787 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) ; Goddard
v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 884, 885 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936).
.2. St. Charles v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 463, 464 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
Even though the term has ended, that by itself does not cut off the rights of the
defendant. Schackow, et al. v. Government of the Canal Zone, 104 F. (2d) 681,
682 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (applying Rule IX by way of an analogy to appeal from
Canal Zone).
1.. Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 81 L. ed. 976 (1937).
131 Forte v. United States, 302 U. S. 220, 58 S. Ct. 180, 82 L. ed. 209 (1937).
1.. Sanford v. United States, 98 F. (2d) 325, 326 (App. D. C. 1938). The
court cited Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 81 L. ed. 976
(1937) ; Young v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 305 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937) ; Miller
v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
22 Holt v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 90, 94 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937).
1' United States v. Adamowicz, 82 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). The
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or disabled, only he has the power to extend the time for settling the
bill of exceptions. That the trial judge was absent from the district
would not excuse failure to have the bill of exceptions settled and signed
within thirty days after the taking of the appeal since the rule does pro-
vide for settlement by another judge.
135
However, the filing of a bill of exceptions with the clerk within the
period of extension allowed by the judge for settlement of a bill of
exceptions is timely, notwithstanding the absence of the trial judge
from the -district and resultant delay in the settlement of the bill beyond
the time granted, where filing with the clerk was permitted by local
rule. 136* The bill is then constructively in the hands of the judge and
appellant has done all that he could to procure the bill to be settled.
Rule IX, paragraph 1, provides that the "bill of exceptions shall be
settled by the trial judge as promptly as possible." This result has not
always been achieved but there has been some reduction in delay. A
study has shown as to certain cases sampled that the time interval
between sentence and approval of the bill of exceptions before the rule
in the First Circuit was 73 'days before and 75 days after the rule, in
the Second 131 days before and 85 after, in the Third 83 before and
46 after, in the Fourth 50 before and 39 after, in the Fifth 84 before
and 52 after, in the Sixth 126 before and 109 after, in the Seventh 98
before and 65 after, in the Eighth 95 before and 77 after, in the Ninth
151 before and 61 after, and in the Tenth 117 before and 76 after.
137
The circuit court will not review a ruling on a motion to quash a
search warrant and suppress evidence, where no exception was taken
to the ruling at the time and where neither bill of exceptions nor assign-
ment of errors were filed on time and were not therefore properly
before the court.'
38
court cited the definition of a trial judge laid down in Rule XIII. In United
States v. Freundlich, 95 F. (2d) 376, 380 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), the extension was
not made by the judge who tried the case. The court stated that possibly the trial
judge was absent, but the fact does not appear. In Walker v. United States, 113
F. (2d) 314, 316 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940), illness was held a ground for settling by
another judge, without any reference -being made to any rule.
". Forte v. United States, 302 U. S. 220, 58 S. Ct. 180, 82 L. ed. 209 (1937)
(certificate from App. D. C.), overruling, In re Lee, 87 F. (2d) 142 (C. C. A.
5th, 1936).
" In re Lee, 87 F. (2d) 142, 143 (C.'C. A. 5th, 1936). The court held that
mandamus would not lie to compel the trial judge to settle and sign a particular
bill of exceptions submitted, since the judge has discretion to examine objections
and determine whether the bill correctly discloses the course of the trial. Cf.
Wolpa v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 829, 831 (C. C. A. 8,h, 1936), where, with one
judge dissenting, the possibility of mandamus is suggester1 .
As to the point of the sufficiency of filing a proposed bill with the clerk of the
court when the judge is absent from the district, this case is overruled by Forte
v. United States, 302 U. S. 220, 58 S. Ct. 180, 82 L. ed. 209 (1937).
"" Note (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 983, 989-992. Tables II-V.
... Cusamano v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 132, 133 (C. C. A. 8th. 1936);
accord, Hannon v. United States, 99 F. (2d) 933, 934 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938).
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The time for filing the assignment of errors is the same as that for
settling the bill of exceptions.139 The time allowed under Rule IX for
filing a bill of exceptions and assignment of errors is under Rule XIII
not to include holidays and Sundays.
40
Rule IX, paragraph 2. Bills of exceptions shall conform to the
provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Upon filing of the bill of exceptions and assignment of errors,
the clerk of the trial court shall forthwith transmit them, together
with such matters of records as are pertinent to the appeal, with
his certificate, to the clerk of the appellate court, and the papers
so forwarded shall constitute the record on appeal.
The bill of exceptions must be settled in accordance with Supreme
Court Rule 8 requiring evidence to be in narrative form.J4 1  Where
the bill is not in condensed and narrative form, the circuit court may
return it to the trial judge and require appropriate correction, and the
trial judge could make such correction under the direction of the
circuit court.
42
Under the Revised Rules, adopted by the Supreme Court February
13, 1939, effective February 27, 1939, Rule 8 has been liberalized to
allow the evidence to be set out in full as well as in narrative form.
43
Rule 8 now provides: "The judges of the district courts in allowing
bills of exception shall give effect to the following rules:
"2. Only so much of the evidence shall be embraced in a bill of
exceptions as may be necessary to present clearly the questions of law
involved in the rulings to which the exceptions are reserved, and such
evidence as is embraced therein may be set forth in full or in condensed
and narrative form.
"See Rules of Civil Procedure 46, 51, 75, 76, and 81."
In one situation the trial judge had died before approval and settling
of the bill of exceptions. A designated judge ordered inclusion of
certain evidence, and neither side was satisfied with the bill of excep-
tions as approved. As the decision turned on the evidence, and a
properly certified transcript of all the evidence was before the review-
"' Long v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 482, 484 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) (rehearing
denied).
'Young v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 305 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937); Yep v.
United States, 83 F. (2d) 41, 42 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936).
141 United States v. Ray, 86 F. (2d) 942, 944 (C. C. A. 2d; 1936).
142 Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 81 L. ed. 976 (1937).
14243 STAT. 1028 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. p. 75 (Supp. 1942). Hence the late
Judge Rufus E. Foster concludes that on the analogy of Civil Rule 73(g) ninety
days should be enough in which to prepare the record. Foster, Criminal Appeals
Rules (1939) 1 Fed. Rules Dec. 261.
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ing court, the court granted a motion by the district attorney to include
a transcript of all the evidence as part of the bill of exceptions.
44
The record certified to the circuit court is the record on which the
appeal is to be heard.14
5
Rule IX, paragraph 4. The appellate court may at any time, on
five (5) days' notice, entertain a motion by either party for the
correction, amplification, or reduction of the record filed with the
appellate court and may issue such directions to the trial court, or
trial judge, in relation thereto, as may be appropriate.
Where the bill of exceptions is not in condensed and narrative form,
the circuit court, under Rule IX, paragraph 4, as well as paragraph 2,
may return it to the trial judge and require appropriate correction, and
the trial judge can make such correction under the direction of the
circuit court. 146 The authority of the circuit court extends to the "cor-
rection, amplification, or reduction" of the record on appeal of which
the bill of exceptions is a part. The appellate court is authorized to
require a proper bill of exceptions and to give any directions to the trial
court or trial judge that may be necessary to attain that end.
Such was the decision of the Supreme Court, and, also, it had been
held in the case below that the circuit court could not under the fourth
paragraph of Rule IX extend the time for settling and filing the bill
of exceptions after the expiration of the thirty-day period. Settling
the bill, it had been held, was for the trial judge alone.147 The circuit
court might correct the record so as properly to reflect proceedings in
the district court by adding papers not certified by the clerk or striking
out unnecessary papers, and might correct its own record if it is not
stated properly.
Where the state of the record was such that the circuit court could
not consider the defendant's contention that the trial court had erred
in denying his plea of former acquittal, the circuit court would order
that time for presentation to and allowance by the trial court of the
bill of exceptions be extended and that all evidence introduced on hear-
ing of the plea of former acquittal be included.
148
"4Moore v. United States, 123 F. (2d) 207, 208 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941). The
court stated that its decision to include the evidence in the bill was limited to the
facts of the case and was not to be considered as authority for amending bills
of exceptions by this court. Cf. Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct.
700 85 L. ed. 976 (1937).1" Edwards v. United States, 312 U. S. 473, 61 S. Ct. 669, 85 L. ed. 957 (1941).
4"Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 81 L. ed. 976 (1937).
For a statement of the law -prior to the rules, see Walker v. United States, 113
F. (2d) 314, 317 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
'" United States v. Ray, 86 F. (2d) 942, 944 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). The court
cited United States v. Adarnowicz, 82 F. (2d) 288 (C. C.A. 2d, 1936).
14I Ross v. United States, 102 F. .(2d) 113, 114 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
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Where counsel for defendant did all he could properly do to have
the bill approved by the trial judge within the time fixed by the court
order, but failed as a result of the court reporter's delay in returning
the transcript to the clerk after rewriting a portion thereof because of
rechecking by the assistant district attorney and the wish of the judge
to recheck it, a motion to dismiss would be overruled.149 Such a motion
should be treated as a motion to strike the bill of exceptions, as defend-
ant has a right of review for errors in the record proper.
Neither the requirement that the bill of exceptions be settled and
filed within thirty days after the taking of appeal or such further time
as within the period may be fixed by the court, nor any other require-
ment subsequent to taking of appeal, can be regarded as jurisdictional. 150
Where the indigent defendant within the time for appeal wrote a letter
informing the trial judge of a desire to appeal and uncertainty regarding
intentions of volunteer and assigned counsel, and the trial judge, in
reply after the time for appeal had expired, improperly failed to inform
the defendant that he might appeal in propria persona, and in effect
prevented the defendant from taking steps to perfect his appeal, the
appeal will be considered as taken in time, despite failure of the defend-
ant to perfect the record and present the appeal.
A petition by the defendant for writ of certiorari to be directed to
a trial court instructing the court to forward to the circuit court a
stenographic report of testimony of certain witnesses and the proposed
bill of exceptions of the defendant and his objections to the amendments
of the government, and a request that the circuit court direct the trial
court to send up the government's amendments to the proposed bill,
would be denied because the circuit court would not assume the burden
of writing the bill of exceptions for the defendant. 51
Rule IX, paragraph 4, applies to appeals from the District Court
for the District of Columbia but not to appeals from the police court.,
2
RULE x. Setting the appeal for argument
Save where good cause is shown for an earlier hearing, the
appellate court shall set the appeal for argument on a date not
less than thirty (30) days after the filing in that court of the
record on appeal and as soon after the expiration of that period
as the state of the *calendar of the appellate court will permit.
' Hall et a. v. United States, 106 F. (2d) 684, 686 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
The circuit court on September 18, 1939, by a nunc pro tunc order directed an
extension of time from June 15 to July 1, 1939.
1. Boykin v. Huff, 121 F. (2d) 865, 873 (App. D. C. 1941).
""Walker et al. v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 314, 320 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
This case raises a number of questions as to the action of the circuit court in
allowing alterations made in the bill of exceptions sent up."2Clawans v. District of Columbia, 89 F. (2d) 802, 804 (App. D. C. 1937).
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Preference shall be given to criminal appeals over appeals in
civil cases.
Rule X is emphatic that criminal appeals should be brought to a
speedy hearing. It expressly commands a prompt hearing and that
preference should be given to criminal appeals over appeals in civil
cases. "Appeals in criminal cases are thus properly to be heard
wherever the Court is sitting, without special order, and on no other
notice than is customarily given of the setting of cases for argument."'15
Rule X applies where the record is timely filed. But where there is no
apparent effort to prepare the record and it is not in fact timely filed,
the appellate court may dismiss under Rule IV, paragraph 3. The
court may set the matter on its docket for hearing and where there is
no appearance and no motion for continuance or other relief, may dis-
miss the appeal. The defendant cannot postpone disposition of the
appeal by delaying beyond the time allowed for the preparation and
filing of the record.
A sampling of cases before and after adoption of the Rule has
shown the following intervals between the filing of the last paper in the
circuit court and the judgment of that court: in the Second Circuit
46 days before and 38 days after, in the Third 125 days before and 182
after, in the Fourth 64 before and 28 after, in the Fifth 28 before and
48 after, in the Sixth 133 before and 73 after, in the Seventh 115 before
and 62 after, in the Eighth 72 before and 75 after, in the Ninth 99
before and 107 after, and in the Tenth 118 before and 95 after.
114
RULE XI. Writs of certiorari
Petition to the Supreme Court of the United States for writ
of certiorari to review a judgment of the appellate court shall be
made within thirty (30) days after the entry of the judgment of
that court. Such petition shall be made as prescribed in Rules
38 and 39 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.
A judgment of the citcuit court affirming the district court's order
dismissing a petition for correction of sentence is a judgment in a
criminal proceeding after verdict and judgment of conviction, and
petition for certiorari to review the judgment was a "subsequent pro-
ceeding" in such a case to which Rule XI requiring petition to be made
within thirty days after entry of judgment applied.', It is immaterial
"'Weber v. United States, 104 F. (2d) 300, 301 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U. S. 590, 60 S. Ct. 119, 84 L. ed. 494 (1940), rehearing denied, 308
U. S. 637, 60 S. Ct. 178, 84 L. ed. 529 (1940).
"'Note (1939) 52 HAgv. L. REv. 983, 989-992, Tables II-V.
",' United States ex rel. Coy v. United States et al., - U. S. -, 62 S. Ct.
1137, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1052 (1942). For the same case in the district court,
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that Rule III omitted to provide for an appeal from the order of the
district court in such cases.
RULE XIi. Local rules
Each appellate court may prescribe rules, not inconsistent with
the foregoing rules, with respect to cost bonds, the procedure on
the hearing of appeals, the issue of mandates, and the time and
manner in which petitions for rehearing may be presented.
Pursuant to Rule XII the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth
Circuit adopted a rule relating to the assignment of errors. x56 Under
the rule the -defendant is required to "set out separately and particularly
each error asserted and intended to be urged." -When the "error al-
leged is as to the admission or rejection of evidence, the assignment
of errors shall quote the grounds urged at the trial for the objection
and the exception taken and the full substance of the evidence admitted
or rejected"; and "errors not assigned according to this rule will be
disregarded, but the court, at its option, may notice a plain error not
assigned." The court stated that the Rule was adopted "after forty
years of experience to promote the efficiency and convenience of the
court, and in order that assigned errors would not be misunderstood."
RULE XIII
Rule XIII, paragraph 1. In the foregoing rules, the phrase "trial
court" shall be deemed to refer to the District Courts of the
United States and the Supreme Court of the District of Colum-
bia; the phrase "trial judge" includes the judge before whom the
case was tried or brought to judgment and, in case of his absence
from the district, or disability, or death, ainy other judge assigned
to hold, or holding, the court in which the case was tried or
brought to judgment; the phrase "appellate court" shall be deemed
to refer to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
An order of the Supreme Court effective July 1, 1941, extended
the operation of the rules to the district courts of Alaska, Hawaii,
Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, and Virgin Islands.157 An act of June 1,
see 38 F. Supp. 610 (W. D. Ky. 1941); and in the circuit court, 124 F. (2d)
1019 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
"'Walker v. United States, 116 F. (2d) 458, 463 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940). The
court also relied on Rules IV and IX. The circuit court refused, therefore, to
consider assignments of error relating to the admission of evidence flagrantly
violating its rules.
157312 U. S. 721, 61 S. Ct. CLIII, 85 L. ed. 731 (1941).
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1934,158 changed the name of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia to United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia. An act of June 25, 1936,159 changed the name of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia to the District Court of the United
States for the District of Columbia.
The phrase "trial judge," used in Rule IX and defined in Rule XIII
means the judge who tried the case, or in case of his absence from the
district, or disability, or -death, any other judge assigned to hold, or
holding, the court in which the case was tried.160
Rule XIII, paragraph 2. For the purpose of computing time as
specified in the foregoing rules, Sundays and legal holidays
(whether under Federal law or under the law of the State where
the case was brought) shall be excluded.
Where judgment was entered on June 4, 1940, and notice of appeal
was filed with the clerk on June 10th, since one of the intervening
days was a Sunday, the notice was seasonably filed."'0 Under this
Rule, an order of May 21, 1935, allowing thirty additional days to file
a bill of exceptions and assignment of errors would give the defendant
until July 31, 1935, to act since the Rule excludes Sundays and
holidays.1
62
Where the last day of an extended period for settling and filing fell
on a Sunday, settlement on the following day is sufficient.163 Where
there is a plea of guilty and judgment of conviction on Saturday,
September 19, 1936, and a motion for new trial is filed on Friday,
September 25, 1936, it is made two days after the expiration of the
three-day period allowed. 04
In one case the government argued that the Rule refers to a "com-
putation," as where the extension is for a certain term or period, and
"'8 Act of June 1, 1934, 48 STAT. 926, c. 46.
... Act of June 25, 1936, 49 STAT. 1921, c. 804...0 United States v. Adamowicz, 82 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert.
denied, 298 U. S. 664, 56 S. Ct. 748, 80 L. ed. 1388 (1935). No reference to the
rule was made in Walker v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 314, 316 (C. C. A. 9th,
1940), but simply to 31 STAT. 270 (1900), 28 U. S. C. A. 776 (1928).
181 Scott v. United States, 115 F. (2d) 137, 138 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940), ccrt.
denied, 312 U. S. 678, 61 S. Ct. 449, 85 L. ed. 1117 (1940).
.62 Yep v. United States, 83 F. (2d) 41, 42 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936). The court
applied Rule IX. Accord, Young v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 305 (C. C. A.
10th, 1937) ; Evans v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 851, 852 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) ;
Dreher v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 859, 860 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). Rule XIII
was applied to Rule 11(2) in Decker v. United States, 97 F. (2d) 473, 474
(C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
... United States v. Ray, 86 F. (2d) 942, 944 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), afirined,
Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 81 L. ed. 976 (1937).
'a Ogwin v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 494, 495 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
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not to a case where a specific date is fixed. But the Supreme Court
regarded such a construction as too narrow. Chief justice Hughes
stated: "The phrase 'For the purpose of computing time' was plainly
intended to be of general application and 'computing' naturally em-
braces whatever reckoning is necessary to fix the time allowed."' 1 0
Thus where the time for settling and filing a bill of exceptions is ex-
tended to November 1, 1936, and that day is Sunday, settling and filing
on Monday is proper.
"" Ray v. United States, 301 U. S. 158, 57 S. Ct. 700, 81 L. ed. 976 (1937).
